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FLOATING LIENS AND BANKRUPTCY
ness or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee;
(B) made not later than 45 days after such debt was incurred;
(C) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of
the debtor and the transferee; and
(D) made according to ordinary business terms;
(3) of a security interest in property acquired by the debtor-
(A) to the extent such security interest secures new value that
was-
(i) given at or after the signing of a security agreement that
contains a description of such property as collateral;
(ii) given by or on behalf of the secured party under such
agreement;
(iii) given to enable the debtor to acquire such property; and
(iv) in fact used by the debtor to acquire such property; and
(B) that is perfected before 10 days after such security interest
attaches;
(4) to or for the benefit of a creditor, to the extent that, after such trans-
fer, such creditor gave new value to or for the benefit of the debtor-
(A) not secured by an otherwise unavoidable security interest;
and
(B) on account of which new value the debtor did not make an
otherwise unavoidable transfer to or for the benefit of such creditor;
(5) of a perfected security interest in inventory or a receivable or the
proceeds of either, except to the extent that the aggregate of all such trans-
fers to the transferee caused a reduction, as of the date of the filing of the
petition and to the prejudice of other creditors holding unsecured claims, of
any amount by which the debt secured by such security interest exceeded
the value of all security interest for such debt on the later of-
(A) (i) with respect to a transfer to which subsection (b)(4)(A) of
this section applies, 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition;
or
(ii) with respect to a transfer to which subsection (b)(4)(B)
of this section applies, one year before the date of the filing of the peti-
tion; and
(B) the date on which new value was first given under the secur-
ity agreement creating such security interest; or
(6) that is the fixing of a statutory lien that is not avoidable under sec-
tion 545 of this title.
(d) A trustee may avoid a transfer of property of the debtor transferred
to secure reimbursement of a surety that furnished a bond or other obliga-
tion to dissolve a judicial lien that would have been avoidable by the trustee
under subsection (b) of this section. The liability of such surety under such
bond or obligation shall be discharged to the extent of the value of such
property recovered by the trustee or the amount paid to the trustee.
(e)(1) For the purposes of this section-
(A) a transfer of real property other than fixtures, but including
the interest of a seller or purchaser under a contract for the sale of real
property, is perfected when a bona fide purchaser of such property
from the debtor against whom applicable law permits such transfer to
be perfected cannot acquire an interest that is superior to the interest
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of the transferee; and
(B) a transfer of a fixture or property other than real property is
perfected when a creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a judicial
lien that is superior to the interest of the transferee.
(2) For the purposes of this section, except as provided in paragraph
(3) of this subsection, a transfer is made-
(A) at the time such transfer takes effect between the transferor
and the transferee, if such transfer is perfected at, or within 10 days
after, such time;
(B) at the time such transfer is perfected, if such transfer is per-
fected after such 10 days; or
(C) immediately before the date of the filing of the petition, if
such transfer is not perfected at the later of-
(i) the commencement of the case; and
(ii) 10 days after such transfer takes effect between the trans-
feror and the transferee.
(3) For the purposes of this section, a transfer is not made until the
debtor has acquired rights in the property transferred.
(f) For the purposes of this section, the debtor is presumed to have been
insolvent on and during the 90 days immediately preceding the date of the
filing of the petition.
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COMMENT
STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON THE
EXERCISE OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN
WISCONSIN: DUAL REQUIREMENTS OF
PRIOR NEGOTIATION AND PROVISION OF
NEGOTIATING MATERIALS
I. INTRODUCTION
It is a fundamental concept that property derives much of
its value and stability from the protection which it receives
from the state,1 and from the laws by which its ownership,
acquisition, enjoyment, transfer, and devolution are ascer-
tained and controlled. Equally basic is the right of the state,
in return for that protection, and by virtue of the same source
of power by which it protects, to take so much of the property
of its citizens as may be necessary for its own maintenance.
This power is usually referred to as "eminent domain."2 All
private property is held subject to this demand.$ The states
have seen fit, however, to limit and regulate the exercise of
this power by constitutional and statutory means. Once such
restrictions have been placed on the power, it is most often
held that the conditions thereby imposed must be strictly
construed.
This comment examines two such statutory restraints
placed on the exercise of eminent domain in Wisconsin. The
first is the requirement that the state conduct negotiations
with the property owner prior to the institution of eminent
domain proceedings.' The second is a requirement that the
state provide to the property owner, as an aid to the negotia-
1. That is to say, the "sovereign." See, e.g., Monongahela Navigation Co. v.
United States, 148 U.S. 312, 324 (1893).
2. Grant, The "Higher Law" Background of the Law of Eminent Domain, 6 Wis.
L. Rav. 67 (1931); Kratovil and Harrison, Eminent Domain - Policy and Concept, 42
CALrF. L. REv. 596 (1954); Michelnan, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on
the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165 (1967);
Sax, Takings and the Police Power: Eminent Domain, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
3. See, e.g., Long Island Water Supply Co. v. City of Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685, 689-
90 (1897); People v. Adirondack Ry. Co., 160 N.Y. 225, 238, 54 N.E. 689, 692 (1899).
4. Wis. STAT. §§ 32.05(2a) and 32.06(2a) (1977).
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tion process, a map of the area sought to be taken and a list
containing the names of other property owners similarly situ-
ated.' This study also examines the role of the court in deter-
mining whether sufficient "negotiations" have been con-
ducted.
II. THE POWER TO TAKE
A. Definition and Source
"Eminent domain" is usually defined as the power of the
sovereign to take property for public use without the consent
of the owner upon the payment of just compensation.6 The
essence of eminent domain involves a power which can be ex-
ercised without regard to the consent of private landowners,
limited only by the constitutional requirements that the
power be exercised for a "public use" and upon the payment
of "just compensation."
The power of eminent domain is at the very center of the
concept of sovereignty.8 The now-accepted theory is that emi-
nent domain is an inherent power, an attribute of sover-
eignty,9 and an undeniable political necessity of any civilized
state.10 As one author has commented, the power "comes into
5. Id.
6. United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 518-19 (1883); Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98
U.S. 403, 406 (1878); Whiting v. Sheboygan & Fond du Lac R.R. Co., 25 Wis. 167, 182
(1869).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
8. United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 518-19 (1883); Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98
U.S. 403, 406 (1878); Kohn v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371-72 (1875).
9. Georgia v. City of Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472, 480 (1924); People v. Adirondack
Ry. Co., 160 N.Y. 225, 236-38, 54 N.E. 689, 692 (1899).
10. According to the treatises, the inherent power to take private property for
public use has been exercised at least since the time of Roman civilization, but the
peace time exercise of such power did not begin until much later. It was not until
approximately the 16th century that the taking of private property for public use as a
distinct and separate governmental power began to be discussed. As civilizations be-
came more advanced and complex, the necessity for governmental action in times of
peace increased, and concurrently the rights of the individual property owner began
to be recognized in greater detail. 1 NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.12[1],
at 1-12 (rev. 3d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as 1 NICHOLS].
The first use of the modern day term "eminent domain" ("dominium eminens,"
lit. "outstanding absolute ownership") apparently appeared in the book LAWS OF WAR
AN PEAcE, (DE Iumi BELLI AC PACIS (1625), cited in 1 NICHOLS, supra, § 1.121], at 1-
12) by Hugo Grotius. Even in this apparent first use of the term, the author recog-
nized the concomitant duty of the state to provide a just compensation to the individ-
ual property owner upon a taking from him:
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being eo instante with the establishment of the government
and continues as long as the government endures."11 Being an
inherent power of sovereignty, eminent domain need not be
recognized either by a constitutional or statutory provision to
be validly exercised. 12 The power of eminent domain is an ab-
solute and unlimited power.1 3 But, as is the case in all of the
fifty states and at the federal level, this unlimited, absolute
power has been restricted by constitutional and statutory
provisions. 14
B. Limitations on the Power to Take Imposed by the
Constitution
When unfettered by law, the sovereign has the absolute
right to take property. This unbridled power, however, has
been limited by the requirements of "due process," "public
use," and "just compensation."1 5 The fifth amendment pro-
vides that no person shall be deprived of property without
due process of law."6 Further, the same amendment requires
[T]he property of subjects is under the eminent domain of the state, so that
the state . . . may use and even alienate . . . such property. . . for ends of
public utility, to which ends those who founded civil society must be supposed
to have intended that private ends should give way. But it is to be added that
when this is done, the state is bound to make good the loss to those who lose
their property ....
DE IURI BsLLI AC PACIS, Lib. 3, ch. 20 (1625), quoted in 1 NICHOLS, supra, § 1.12[1], at
1-12.
The term "eminent domain" was unknown to the common law, George v. Consol.
Lighting Co., 87 Vt. 411, _ 89 A. 635, 637 (1914), although its exercise was not.
And while Grotius coined the term, his idea of the theory upon which the power was
founded, namely, that the state has an original and absolute ownership of all the
property possessed by its individual members, is not now generally considered to be
the correct one. 1 NICHOLS, supra, § 1.13, at 1-15. Instead, the better view appears to
be that the power derives from the very nature of sovereignty itself. Id., § 1.1412] at
1-20.
11. 1 NICHOLS, supra note 10, § 1.1412], at 1-23.
12. Adirondack Ry. Co. v. New York, 176 U.S. 335, 346-47 (1900); United States v.
Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 518 (1883); Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878); Fer-
guson v. City of Kenosha, 5 Wis. 2d 556, 564, 93 N.W.2d 460, 464 (1958); Muscoda
Bridge Co. v. Worden-Allen Co., 196 Wis. 76, 86-87, 219 N.W. 428, 433 (1928).
13. Adirondack Ry. Co. v. New York, 176 U.S. 335, 346-47 (1900); United States v.
Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 518 (1883); Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878); Fer-
guson v. City of Kenosha, 5 Wis. 2d 556, 564, 93 N.W.2d 460, 464 (1958); Muscoda
Bridge Co. v. Worden-Allen Co., 196 Wis. 76, 86-87, 219 N.W. 428, 433 (1928).
14. See, e.g., U.S. CONsT. amend. V; Wis. CONST. art. I, § 13.
15. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
16. Id.
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that no private property "be taken for public use, without just
compensation. 1 7 These three limits are imposed on the fed-
eral government through the direct application of the fifth
amendment,18 and on the state through the fifth and four-
teenth amendments. 9 These restrictions prohibit the state
from utilizing its sovereign power upon the property of any
private person without the availability of proper safeguards.
Thus, proceedings to condemn property by the use of eminent
domain must conform to the requirements of the constitu-
tional provisions imposed.
It has been stated that the due process clause restriction
does not guarantee any particular form or method of statutory
procedure for the exercise of eminent domain.20 The require-
ments of due process are said to be satisfied when there is
reasonable notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard on
the issue of "just compensation. '21 Such a hearing need not be
conducted prior to the actual taking of the property.22 Also,
the due process clause does not require an exact uniformity of
procedure within a state;23 a legislature may adopt one type of
procedure for one type of property or class of property own-
ers, and a different type of procedure for others.2' The right to
exercise the power of eminent domain for a "public use" is
usually satisfied when that power is reasonably related or inci-
17. Id.
18. United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 518 (1883); Kohl v. United States, 91
U.S. 367, 372-73 (1875).
19. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 122 (1978); Chi-
cago, B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
20. Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 369 (1930); Crane v. Hahlo, 258 U.S. 142, 147
(1922); Backus v. Fort Union Depot Co., 169 U.S. 557, 571 (1899).
21. See, e.g., Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 369 (1930).
22. Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57, 58-59 (1919); Crozier v. Krupp, 224 U.S. 290,
306 (1912); Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S. 380, 400-07 (1895).
23. Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 369 (1930).
24. This has been done in Wisconsin. The legislature enacted one procedure for
the condemnation of sewers and transportation facilities; Wis. STAT. § 32.05 (1977);
another for the condemnation of almost all of the property not covered by the proce-
dures for sewers and transportation facilities; Wis. STAT. § 32.06 (1977); and a third
separate and expedited procedure for the condemnation of abandoned and blighted
residential property in urban areas. 1979 Wis. Laws ch. 37, to be codified at Wis.
STAT. § 32.22. Further, the City of Milwaukee is expressly authorized to conduct con-
demnation proceedings under either chapter 32 or the Kline Law, 1931 Wis. Laws ch.
275, as amended. See, Wis. STAT. § 32.03(1) (1977); State ex rel. Allis v. Circuit Court
for Milwaukee County, 189 Wis. 265, 207 N.W. 252 (1926).
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dental to other powers of the state.2
C. Further Statutory Limitations
In determining what shall constitute due process, public
use, and just compensation, the legislature, in the exercise of
its discretion, must necessarily prescribe procedures through
detailed statutory enactments. 8 These statutes are a further
restriction on the absolute and unlimited power of the sover-
eign to take private property.
It is usually said that, for the proper maintenance of con-
demnation proceedings, it is essential that all preliminary con-
ditions and events prescribed by the legislature through the
governing statutes be carried out fully,27 as they are consid-
ered to be jurisdictional in nature.28 In a shorthand manner
the courts usually state that statutes dealing with the exercise
of eminent domain must be closely followed and strictly
construed.
III. THE WISCONSIN STATUTORY SCHEME
In Wisconsin, the legislature has established a general
scheme for the proper maintenance of condemnation proceed-
ings under the provisions of sections 32.01 to 32.28 of the stat-
utes. The statutory scheme requires that, before the com-
mencement of condemnation proceedings, there be a deter-
mination of the necessity for the taking.30 Next, the con-
demnor must make at least one appraisal of all the property
proposed to be acquired, and the appraiser must, if reasonably
possible, confer with the owner of the property on this mat-
ter."1 The statute then requires that the condemnor attempt
25. Georgia v. City of Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472, 480 (1924); Hairston v. Danville
& W. Ry. Co., 208 U.S. 598 (1908); Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403
(1896).
26. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. §§ 32.01 to 32.28 (1977).
27. Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Roberts, 248 Ark. 1005, -, 455 S.W.2d
125, 127 (1970). In re Bangor-Elec. Co., 314 A.2d 800 (Me. 1974); Ehlers v. Jones, 135
N.W.2d 22 (S.D. 1965).
28. Arrowhead Farms, Inc. v. Dodge County, 21 Wis. 2d 647, 652, 124 N.W.2d 631,
634 (1963); Kultgen v. Mueller, 3 Wis. 2d 346, 350, 88 N.W.2d 687, 689 (1958).
29. Maxey v. Redevelopment Auth. of Racine, 94 Wis. 2d 375, 399, 288 N.W.2d
794, 805 (1980); Herro v. Natural Resources Bd., 53 Wis. 2d 157, 171, 192 N.W.2d
104, 111 (1971); Kultgen v. Mueller, 3 Wis. 2d 346, 350, 88 N.W.2d 687, 690 (1958).
30. Wis. STAT. § 32.07 (1977).
31. Wis. STAT. §§ 32.05(2) and 32.06(2) (1977).
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to personally negotiate with the owner of the property sought
to be taken in an effort to effect a voluntary sale of the prop-
erty.3 2 Thereafter, the condemnor must make a jurisdictional
offer. 3 This offer must be sent to the landowner and must
contain a notice briefly stating the nature of the project and
that the condemnor intends, in good faith, to use the property
for a public purpose. It must describe the property and the
interest sought to be taken, state the proposed date of occu-
pancy, and contain an itemized statement of the amount of
compensation offered. The offer must also include a full nar-
rative appraisal upon which the jurisdictional offer is based,
and must apprise the owner of his right to obtain an appraisal
by another qualified appraiser at the condemnor's expense.
The offer should state that the owner has twenty days to ac-
cept the offer, forty days in which to contest the right of con-
demnation if he does not accept the compensation offer, and
two years in which to appeal for greater compensation.3
If the jurisdictional offer is accepted within the requisite
twenty day period, the transfer of title must be accomplished
within sixty days thereafter.3 If the jurisdictional offer is not
accepted, section 32.06(7) provides that the condemnor may
present a verified petition to the circuit court stating that the
jurisdictional offer has been made and rejected, and that the
condemnor in good faith intends to use the property described
for a specified public purpose. The petition to the circuit
court must not disclose the amount of the jurisdictional offer.
If the circuit court finds that the condemnor is entitled to
condemn the property or any portion of it, the court must im-
mediately assign the matter to the chairman of the county
condemnation commission for a hearing.3 6 The commission
then holds a hearing to determine what compensation should
be made for the taking of the property.
The provisions to be focused on in this article are con-
tained in both Wisconsin Statute section 32.05(2a) and its
companion, section 32.06(2a). These sections are almost iden-
tical. Both require that the condemnor attempt to "negotiate
32. Wis. STAT. §§ 32.05(2a) and 32.06(2a) (1977).
33. Wis. STAT. §§ 32.05(3) and 32.06(3) (1977).
34. Wis. STAT. §§ 32.05(3) and 32.06(3) (1977).
35. Wis. STAT. §§ 32.05(6) and 32.06(6) (1977).
36. Wis. STAT. § 32.06(7) (1977).
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personally" with the owner of the property sought to be
taken, that he provide the owner with copies of a required
pamphlet, the names of at least ten neighboring landowners to
whom offers are being made, and a map showing all the prop-
erty proposed to be acquired by the condemnation proceed-
ings. The major questions created are: (1) What constitutes
"negotiation" under the statute? (2) What does it mean to ne-
gotiate "personally"? and (3) Does the failure to provide the
required list of neighboring landowners and a map showing all
the property affected by the project have any effect on the
condemnation proceedings?
A. Requirement of Negotiation
Because condemnation proceedings pit the power and au-.
thority of the state directly against one or a few individual
property owners, the court has stated:
[t]here is a reluctance on the part of the courts to the
exercise of eminent domain, when the same end may be ac-
complished by the agreement of the parties. The remedy is
harsh in its nature, liable to gross perversion, and one which,
in practice as in theory, encroaches upon the rights of the
individual.37
In order to obviate an initial, direct, and unyielding exercise
of the state's power, many condemnation schemes required a
prior attempt to negotiate a voluntary sale and purchase of
the desired property from the owner.38 Although by their na-
ture, condemnation proceedings are sui generis, and a type of
special proceeding, they are nonetheless adversary in nature.39
Thus, there is a general reluctance to engage in a type of ad-
versary proceeding when the same end, the acquisition of the
property, can be accomplished by voluntary and consensual
means. This reluctance to engage directly and initially in ad-
versary proceedings is embodied within the general policy of
37. City of Milwaukee v. Diller, 194 Wis. 376, 384, 216 N.W. 837, 840 (1927)
(quoting MILLS, EMINENT DOMAIN at 258, 259 (2d. ed.)).
38. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. §§ 32.05(2a) and 32.06(2a) (1977).
39. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28-29 (1959);
United States v. City of Jacksonville, 257 F.2d 330, 333 (8th Cir. 1958); Stewart &
Grundile, Inc. v. State, 524 P.2d 1242, 1246 (Alaska 1974); Pool v. Butler, 141 Cal. 46,
-, 74 P. 444, 445 (1903); Wassenich v. City and County of Denver, 67 Colo. 456,
-, 186 P. 533, 537 (1919).
1980]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
eminent domain as set out in Wis. Stat. section 32.02, which
makes an attempt at agreement between the condemnor and
the property owner a condition precedent to the exercise of
any condemnation powers. 40 The section states that a proper
governmental body is empowered to "acquire by condemna-
tion any real estate and personal property appurtenant
thereto or interest therein which they have power to acquire
and hold or transfer to the state, for the purposes specified, in
case any property cannot be acquired by. . .purchase at an
agreed price. ... 41 As one commentator has stated, under a
statute such as this,
unless there is a bona fide attempt on the part of the con-
demnor to induce the owner to sell the land at a reasonable
figure, the condition under which the power is granted is not
fulfilled and in such case any attempted exercise of eminent
domain is unauthorized and consequently void and of no
effect. 42
This requirement of prior dealing between the parties is in
large measure an attempt to avoid an imposition of the con-
demnation powers of the state upon the individual without a
discussion of the matter between the governing body and the
property owner. The requirement of prior negotiation has
been labeled a material and valuable right of the property
owner.48 Since the general policy of the state places a pre-
mium on a voluntary and consensual arrangement between
the governing body and the private property owner, a great
deal of importance must be placed on exactly what the "nego-
tiation process" is to encompass." Thus, because condemna-
40. Wis. STAT. § 32.02 (1977).
41. Id. (emphasis added).
42. 6 NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMxNEr DOMAIN § 24.62, at 24-155 to 24-158 (rev. 3d
ed. 1976)[hereinafter cited as 6 NICHOLS].
43. Kultgen v. Mueller, 3 Wis. 2d 346, 348, 88 N.W.2d 687, 689 (1958); City of
Milwaukee v. Diller, 194 Wis. 376, 383, 216 N.W. 837, 840 (1927).
44. Wis. STAT. §§ 32.05(2a) and 32.06(2a) (1977) require that an attempt be made
to reach an agreement between the governmental authority and the private property
owner prior to institution of any condemnation proceedings. It is there stated that
the "condemnor shall attempt to negotiate personally with the owner or one of the
owners or his or her representative of the property sought to be taken for the
purchase of the same." Id. (emphasis added). This statutory requirement of a prior
attempt to negotiate personally was added to the statutory scheme in 1959. 1959 Wis.
Laws ch. 639. The original bill, Assem. Bill 483 (1959), introduced to revise the con-
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tion statutes are strictly construed and an attempt at prior
negotiation is a prerequisite to the jurisdiction of the adminis-
trative agency, all appears to hinge on what constitutes "nego-
tiation." The word itself is nowhere defined in any relevant
section of the condemnation statutes.
B. The Meaning of "Negotiate"
Courts have generally formulated broad and undetailed
definitions of the term "negotiation." It is usually said that
each case must be evaluated in light of the unique circum-
stances presented." This, of course, provides scant guidance.
However, several factors are consistently mentioned and from
these one may glean a more or less uniform and comprehen-
sive definition of what the courts consider adequate "negotia-
tion." It should be stated that Wisconsin is not alone in leav-
ing adequate "negotiation" statutorily undefined. In both the
uniform law, dealing with the subject of eminent domain,
promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws46 and in the federal Uniform Relocation
Assistance and Real Property Acquisitions Policies Act of
1970,47 there is no definition nor even a hint of what consti-
demnation procedure in Wisconsin, did not contain the requirements set forth in §
32.05(2a) and its companion provision, § 32.06(2a). During the consideration of the
bill, a complete substitute amendment, Sub. Amd. 1 to Assem. Bill 483 (1959), was
introduced by Representative Ward and it was this bill which became the enacted
version. 1959 Wis. Laws ch. 639.
The substitute amendment added § 32.05(2a), but did not add the companion
provision found in § 32.06(2a). The legislative comment accompanying the section
requiring personal negotiation between the parties did not specifically discuss that
provision. Instead, the comment referred to the need for the jurisdictional offer to be
full and complete in its contents. This was desired so that the landowner could exer-
cise an informed choice on whether or not to consent to a purchase. In 1961, §
32.06(2a), which was modeled on § 32.05(2a), was added to the statutes. 1961 Wis.
Laws ch. 486. The bill, which introduced this statute, was not accompanied by any
legislative comments or notes.
45. Herro v. Natural Resources Bd., 53 Wis. 2d 157, 172, 192 N.W.2d 104, 112
(1971) (citing Wampler v. Trustees of Ind. Univ., 241 Ind. 449, 456, 172 N.E.2d 67, 71
(1961)).
46. Section 202(a) of the UNIFORM EMNmENT DOMAIN CODE (1974) requires that the
condemnor "shall make every reasonable and diligent effort to acquire property by
condemnation."
47. Act of Jan. 2, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-646, 84 Stat. 1894. This Act requires that
the "head of a Federal Agency shall make reasonable effort to acquire expeditiously
real property by negotiation." § 301(1), 84 Stat. 1904 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
4651(1) (1976)).
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tutes this required negotiation. The elements and factors
which the courts consider when they evaluate the adequacy of
a prior attempt to agree between the parties would, perhaps,
yield a definition substantially along the following lines:
"Negotiation" means the performance of the obligation
of the condemnor to meet and, if necessary, confer person-
ally with the landowner in a good faith attempt to deter-
mine a fair and just purchase price for the subject land.
Such good faith "negotiation" shall be conducted at a rea-
sonable time with the intent of reaching a fair and just
agreement as to the price to be paid for the property. The
duty to negotiate does not, however, compel the condemnor
to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession.
The elements most commonly mentioned might conveniently
be divided into three stages of the negotiation process: (1) the
effort made by the condemnor to reach agreement with the
landowner; (2) the nature of the offer or offers made; and (3)
the extent to which negotiations must be carried out before a
statutory condemnation proceeding may be commenced.
1. The Effort
The condemnor must make an effort to induce the owner
to sell the land at a reasonable figure.48 It is usually stated
that the condemnor must do more than simply make an offer;
he must attempt to move the party along the road to a volun-
tary agreement. The effort to purchase must also be made in
good faith.49 This, of course, is a general rule of modern con-
tract law5" and has been carried over by the courts into the
area of condemnation proceedings.
A bona fide effort to purchase the property involves a will-
48. Kerr v. Raney, 305 F. Supp. 1152, 1156 (W.D. Ark. 1969); State v. Bair, 83
Idaho 475, 480, 365 P.2d 216, 219 (1961); Wampler v. Trustees of Ind. Univ., 241 Ind.
449, 456-57, 172 N.E.2d 67, 71 (1961); Wolfe v. State Dept. of Roads, 179 Neb. 189,
-, 137 N.W.2d 721, 724 (1965); Prairie View Tel. Co. v. County of Cherry, 179
Neb. 382, -, 138 N.W.2d 468, 470 (1965).
49. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Lasseigne, 256 La. 119, -, 240 So. 2d 707,
710 (1970); Zeigler v. Brown, 339 Mich. 390, -, 63 N.W.2d 677, 680 (1954); W.
Robidoux Printing & Lithographing Co., Inc. v. Missouri State Highway Comm'n, 498
S.W.2d 745, 748 (Mo. 1973); City of Houston v. Plantation Land Co., 440 S.W.2d 691,
693-94 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
50. See, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 231 (Tent. Draft Nos. 1-7, 1973).
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ingness to pay the market value. 51 As noted earlier, one of the
underlying principles of eminent domain is that a private
property owner should not be forced to subsidize a public pro-
ject. Just compensation, therefore, requires that he get a fair
deal for his property.
The effort to purchase must be made without duress.52
There can be no voluntary and consensual agreement if undue
pressure is put upon the private property owner. Allowing the
condemnor to use duress in extracting an agreement between
the parties would produce no more than a capitulation by the
private property owner and would be, in effect, a "taking" by
the condemnor in an almost quasi-condemnation proceeding,
but without the safequards imposed by the chapter on such
proceedings.
2. The Offer
A merely perfunctory or formal offer is not sufficient." A
perfunctory offer is inadequate because it evidences both a
lack of effort to induce the owner to sell and the absence of
good faith on the part of the condemnor. Such an offer is con-
sidered to be, in essence, no offer at all.
The offer must be on reasonable terms." It is evident that
an unreasonable offer in light of the circumstances would in
no way promote a voluntary and consensual agreement be-
tween the parties. Thus the offer must be reasonable because
it will merely frustrate the proceedings if it is not.
3. The Extent of Negotiations
A mere difference in amount between the parties does not
51. United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979); Boom Co. v.
Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 408 (1878); United States v. 320.0 Acres of Land, 605 F.2d
762, 781 (5th Cir. 1979); In re Rogers, 243 Mich. 517, - , 220 N.W. 808, 811 (1928).
See also, Wis. STAT. § 32.09(5) (1977).
52. Moseley v. Ownesboro Mun. Housing Comm'n, 252 S.W.2d 880, 881 (Ky. App.
1952). See also, Roelvink v. City of Milwaukee, 273 Wis. 605, 608-09, 79 N.W.2d 106,
108-09 (1956).
53. Kerr v. Raney, 305 F. Supp. 1152, 1156 (W.D. Ark. 1969); State v. Bair, 83
Idaho 475, 480, 365 P.2d 216, 219 (1961); In re Rogers, 243 Mich. 517, -, 220 N.W.
808, 811 (1928); In re Bronx Parkway Comm'n, 176 App. Div. 717, 720, 163 N.Y.S.
882, 884-85 (1917).
54. Dantzler v. Mississippi State Highway Comm'n, 190 Miss. 137, -, 199 So.
367, 369 (1941).
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determine whether a bona fide attempt to agree has been
made.5 In not requiring the parties to negotiate to impasse,
the courts have not, however, allowed a difference in amount
between the respective offers and counteroffers to be in and of
itself sufficient to show that a good faith effort has been made
to induce the owner to sell on reasonable terms.
If it becomes apparent that no agreement can be made at a
price that is satisfactory to the condemnor, the effort to agree
may be dropped." That is to say, the condemnor need not
make any further effort to procure an agreement when the at-
titude of the owner is such that it is clear that he will not
accept an offer which the condemnor deems reasonable. Al-
though the condemnor must negotiate in good faith, it need
not make any concession to the private property owner on
terms which it considers in good faith to be unreasonable.
No lengthy series of negotiations, offers, and counteroffers
is needed to meet the requirement of the statute.57 It is not
the length or quantity of the negotiations which determines
whether or not they are adequate, but, instead, whether the
quality of the negotiations is adequate and sufficient to show a
good faith and vigorous attempt to induce a voluntary and
reasonable settlement.
Condemnation requires an effort to purchase the property
and a showing that the parties are unable to agree. It does not
require an absolute inablity but merely a bona fide effort to
purchase under reasonable terms.5 8 To show good faith in the
negotiating process, the condemnor need not demonstrate
that it has inadequate funds on hand or is unable to procure
adequate funds within a reasonable time to meet the demands
55. City of Evanston v. Piotrowicz, 20 IlM. 2d 512, 518, 170 N.E.2d 569, 573 (1960).
56. United States v. Certain Interests in Property in County of Cascade 163 F.
Supp. 518, 524 (D. Mont. 1958); Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Hadwiger, 471 S.W.2d
157, 159 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
57. Kerr v. Raney, 305 F. Supp. 1152, 1156 (W.D. Ark. 1969); United States v.
Certain Interests in Property in County of Cascade, 163 F. Supp. 518, 524 (D. Mont.
1958); Murray v. City of Richmond, 257 Ind. 548, 553, 276 N.E.2d 519, 522 (1971);
Jamestown Urban Renewal Agency v. Dimas, 70 Misc. 2d 259, 264, 332 N.Y.S.2d 670,
674-75 (County Ct. 1972).
58. Dzur v. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 257 Ind. 674, 678, 278 N.E.2d 563, 565-
66 (1972); State ex reL. State Highway Comm'n v. Pinkley, 474 S.W.2d 46, 49 (Mo.
App. 1971); Grace Land & Cattle Co. v. Tri-State Generation and Transmission
Ass'n, Inc., 191 Neb. 663, -, 217 N.W.2d 184, 188 (1974).
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put forth by the private property owner. It is necessary only
that the condemnor show that the offer of the private prop-
erty landowner is unreasonable or, if it is reasonable and is
still not accepted by the condemnor, that there is sufficient
evidence to show why the condemnor has not, in fact, ac-
cepted such reasonable offer.
It is difficult to synthesize these elements into a compact
and understandable format. Varying stress can be put by ei-
ther party on any of the above-stated general rules. An at-
tempt has been made above to summarize and synthesize
these rules into a concise definition but whether or not any
two parties would agree on such a definition is not altogether
certain.
The leading Wisconsin case in this area is Herro v. Natu-
ral Resources Board,59 which dealt with the meaning of the
term "negotiate" under Wis. Stat. section 32.06(2a). As stated
above, this section is identical to the terms of section
32.05(2a). The Wisconsin Supreme Court, relying heavily on
Nichols' treatise and American Jurisprudence,"0 stated the
following rule:
In our judgment the statute [Wis. Stat. section 32.06(2a)]
does not contemplate an impossibility to purchase at any
price, however large, but merely an unwillingness on the
part of the owner to sell only at a price which in the con-
demnor's judgment is excessive. In such an event, the at-
tempt to agree need not be pursued further than to develop
the fact that an agreement to purchase is not possible at any
price which the condemnor is willing to pay.61
This is the extent of the court's explication of the require-
ment that there be personal negotiations between the parties.
It does not contribute much new insight into the meaning of
the term "negotiate," but as one commentator has stated,
"[n]o general rule can be set forth ....
Before the facts of any given controversy about adequate
prior negotiation can be analyzed under the general rules to
59. 53 Wis. 2d 157, 192 N.W.2d 104 (1971).
60. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN (rev. 3d ed. 1976); 27 AM. JuR. 2d
Eminent Domain § 388, at 256 (1966).
61. 53 Wis. 2d at 173, 192 N.W.2d at 112.
62. 6 NICHOLS, supra note 42, § 24.621, at 24-171.
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determine whether or not there has been sufficient and ade-
quate "negotiation" theretofore, one additional factor regard-
ing the Wisconsin statute dealing with the negotiation re-
quirement must be discussed. This is the requirement of
personal negotiation.
C. The Requirement of Personal Negotiations
By their terms, Wis. Stat. sections 32.05(2a) and 32.06(2a)
require that before the jurisdictional offer be made, the con-
demnor shall attempt to "negotiate personally" with the pri-
vate property owner. The above has attempted to outline the
meaning of the word "negotiate" and, thus, the inquiry under
either of the sections becomes what is meant by the term
"personally"? When a statute requires simply that there be
"negotiation," it is generally stated that the question of
whether or not there must be personal negotiations with the
owner or his agent must depend upon the statute itself and
the circumstances surrounding the condemnation proceed-
ings.63 There are cases from other jurisdictions on both sides
of this point. Some hold that there must be face-to-face dis-
cussions prior to the initiation of adversary condemnation
proceedings," while others hold that there is no such require-
ment.e5 As has been stated, "There is no simple answer. A
great deal depends upon the surrounding circumstances and
upon the answer to the further question, what would common
sense dictate in this situation?" 6
Where, however, statutes such as those in Wisconsin re-
quire that negotiations be conducted "personally," it would
appear that the answer to the question whether there must be
face-to-face discussions could be more easily and readily an-
swered. "Negotiate" means to have some sort of communica-
tion, either oral or written, with the initial intent that such
63. Annot., 90 A.L.R.2d 211, 233 (1963).
64. See, e.g., New York Tel. Co. v. Wood, 145 Misc. 481, 259 N.Y.S. 365 (Sup. Ct.
1931); State ex rel. Bremerton Bridge Co. v. Superior Court for Kitsap County, 194
Wash. 7, 76 P.2d 990 (1938).
65. See, e.g., J. M. Foster Co., Inc. v. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., Inc., 164 Ind.
App. 72, 326 N.E.2d 584 (1975); Board of Supervisors of the County of Rockland v.
Sherwood, 268 N.Y. 84, 196 N.E. 752 (1935).
66. Annot., 90 A.L.R.2d 211, 233 (1963).
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communication will lead to agreement between the parties.6 7
When the word "personally" is used in conjunction with the
word "negotiate" it must be admitted that the legislature
meant to delineate more specifically and explain the sort of
negotiations that it contemplated in condemnation pro-
ceedings.
In attempting to resolve what is required by the term "ne-
gotiate personally," one must remember that it is an elemen-
tary rule of statutory construction that every word and clause
contained in a statute must, if possible, be given effect.6 8 The
law is well settled in this area.
[I]t is ". . . a maxim of statutory construction that a law
should be so construed that no word or clause shall be ren-
dered surplusage." Thus every word appearing in a statute
should contribute to the construction of the statute in accor-
dance with its ordinary and customary meaning. As this
court has held, ".... a separate meaning must attach to each
individual term in a legislative act."69
The sound reasoning behind a rule of statutory construction
such as this is especially evident in an inquiry such as the one
required here. If it were unnecessary that every word and
clause be given effect and no word be considered to be inoper-
ative or insignificant, an unavoidable and often irresolvable
conflict would occur. Where there had been some attempt to
negotiate under a statute but no agreement had been reached,
a private property owner would contend that, although there
had been some negotiations, the negotiations were inadequate
because they were not "personal." The private property owner
67. One authority defines "negotiate" to mean: "to bargain with another respect-
ing a purchase and sale; to conduct communications or conferences with a view to
reaching a settlement or agreement." BLAcK'S LAW DICTIONARY 934 (5th ed. 1979).
Another source puts the term as meaning: "To hold communication (with another)
for the purpose of arranging some matter by mutual agreement; to discuss a matter
with a view to some settlement or compromise." 7 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 81
(1933). Whether this particular meaning is accepted as the relevant one under §§
32.05(2a) and 32.06(2a) or not, it must be conceded that the word "negotiate" has a
full and distinct meaning.
68. 2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06, at 63 (4th
ed. C.D. Sands ed. 1973). See also County of Columbia v. Bylewski, 94 Wis. 2d 153,
164, 288 N.W.2d 129, 135 (1980).
69. Johnson v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 672, 676, 251 N.W.2d 834, 836 (1977) (footnotes
and citations omitted).
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would thus put emphasis on the word "personally." The con-
demning authority, on the other hand, would stress that there
had been negotiations and that thus the operative and pri-
mary word in the statute, "negotiate," had been satisfied.
Under this view, the word "personally" would be relegated to
an insignificant role, suggesting merely one mode of con-
ducting negotiations. To avoid such a winnowing and sifting
of the words of a relevant statute, the courts have prudently
fashioned a rule of statutory construction which requires that
every word and clause be given effect, if possible.
Thus, it must be assumed that when the legislature used
the word "personally," it did not intend to be redundant or
superfluous. If the legislature had deemed the word "negoti-
ate" to have implied and carried within its definition the re-
quirement of a face-to-face meeting between the parties, it
would not have used the word "personally" to further amplify
this already implicit and inherent meaning. But the legisla-
ture did use the word "personally" and thus it must be given
its "ordinary and customary" meaning which, in this situa-
tion, can mean only face-to-face meeting. If the word "person-
ally" is allowed to be so broadly defined that it includes any
act of communication including mail, telegraph or telex, the
word becomes redundant since it must be conceded that the
term "negotiate" already has within its meaning the implica-
tion that some sort of communication will occur between the
parties. It thus appears that sections 32.05(2a) and 32.06(2a)
require that the condemnor hold at least one face-to-face
meeting with the private property owner in an attempt to
agree on a purchase price prior to the making of any jurisdic-
tional offer.
D. The "List" and "Map" Requirements
Sections 32.05(2a) and 32.06(2a) state that, during the ne-
gotiation process, the condemnor must provide the owner with
a list containing the names of at least ten neighboring land-
owners to whom offers are being made. In addition, the con-
demnor must provide the owner with a map showing all prop-
erty affected by the project.
These provisions were added to chapter 32 in 1977. The
Legislative Council notes to the original bill show that the
committee was concerned that the landowner have adequate
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information and sufficient means to acquire additional infor-
mation in regard to his negotiations with the condemnor."
Accurate information is essential if a landowner is to make a
fair and reasonable offer, since to do so he must know what
the condemnor is generally offering the neighboring landown-
ers and what the neighboring landowners are offering in re-
turn. This information can be most easily obtained by con-
tacting the landowners directly and, thus, it is important that
the landowner know how to identify and contact such prop-
erty owner.
As the Wisconsin court has said, the requirement of prior
dealing between the condemnor and the landowner is consid-
ered a material and valuable right of the owner of the prop-
70. 1977 Wis. Laws ch. 438. Section 4 and 8 of Assembly Bill 969 first proposed
these changes. This bill was the product of a Legislative Council study and each sec-
tion was explained by notes drafted by that committee.
When the bill was first introduced on September 13, 1977, it proposed the follow-
ing additions to these two sections:
Before attempting to negotiate under this paragraph, the condemnor shall
provide the owner or his or her representative with copies of applicable pam-
phlets prepared under s.32.26(6). When negotiating under this subsection, the
condemnor shall provide the owner or his or her representative with examples
of at least ten offers being made to neighboring landowners, or a list of all
offers if less than ten owners are affected, together with a map showing all
property affected by the project. Id. (emphasis added).
The note to these sections reads in part as follows:
[T]he condemnor must provide the owner with examples of offers being made
to neighboring landowners and a map of the project. This will give the owner
accurate information about the amounts being offered to neighboring landown-
ers and will allow an owner to discover what other properties are affected by
the condemnation action. The owner can also obtain copies of any other map
of the project in the possesion of the condemnor. The owner can request the
name of any other property owner affected by the project. This will give the
owner enough information to identify and contact other property owners. Id.
(emphasis added).
On January 31, 1978, the Assembly Committee on Judiciary introduced Substitute
Amendment 1 to Assembly Bill 969 which modified the language contained in the
original bill. Sub. Amend. 1 to Assem. Bill 969 (1977). Under the substitute amend-
ment, the text of which was passed into law, the proposed addition to §§ 32.05(2a)
and 32.06(2a) was altered to read as follows:
Before attempting to negotiate under this paragraph, the condemnor shall pro-
vide the owner or his or her representative with copies of applicable pamphlets
prepared under s.32.26(6). When negotiating under this subsection, the con-
demnor shall provide the owner or his or her representative with the names of
at least ten neighboring landowners to whom offers are being made, or a list of
all offerees if less than ten owners are affected, together with a map showing all
property affected by the project. Id.
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erty. 1 To exercise this valuable right properly, a property
owner must have sufficient information to make a reasonable
offer to the condemnor. If the landowner does not make a rea-
sonable offer or counteroffer, the condemnor, if it acts in good
faith, could deem the landowner's offer excessive and termi-
nate negotiations. This would end the exercise of the property
owner's valuable right. It appears that the legistature desired
to aid the landowner in the exercise of his right by providing
him the means of acquiring sufficient information to effec-
tively exercise that right. The original method was to have the
condemnor provide the landowner with examples of offers
which the condemnor was making to neighboring landowners
and to provide a map showing all the property affected. This
method was modified by a substitute amendment whereby the
condemnor must now provide the names of neighboring land-
owners and a map showing all the property affected by the
project. The thrust of each of these versions is the same; only
the operation is slightly different. Each method is intended to
provide the landowner with sufficient information so that he
can make a fair and reasonable offer. This being so, the notes
of the Legislative Council, which appear in the original bill,
are equally pertinent in relation to the purpose and intent of
this addition as subsequently modified by the substitute
amendment.
This amendment to sections 32.05(2a) and 32.06(2a) is
wholly in keeping with the purpose of chapter 32 which favors
precondemnation settlement between the parties. By provid-
ing the landowner with an easy means of access to pertinent
and accurate information as it relates to the amount of the
offers that the condemnor is making and, conversely, the type
of offers that the neighboring property owners are making,
there is a greater likelihood that a precondemnation settle-
ment will be entered into between the parties. But is this
enough to make the requirement of the list and the map
mandatory instead of merely directory?
Statutes which can be interpreted as implying that some-
thing be done can be divided into two different types:
mandatory and directory. If a statute is interpreted to be a
71. Kultgen v. Mueller, 3 Wis. 2d 346, 348, 88 N.W.2d 687, 689 (1958); City of
Milwaukee v. Diller, 194 Wis. 376, 383, 216 N.W. 837, 840 (1927).
[Vol. 63:489
LIMITS ON EMINENT DOMAIN
mandatory one, then the thing which must be done is consid-
ered to be a condition precedent to further action.72 If, on the
other hand, the statute is interpreted to be merely directory,
then that which is contained in the statute can be treated as
merely a suggestion that a certain method or mode of proce-
dure be carried out.73 The important distinction is that the
violation of a directory statute is accompanied by no adverse
consequences, while the failure to comply with the require-
ments of a mandatory statute either invalidates the transac-
tion or imposes affirmative legal liabilities.7 4 The difference
between the two types of statutes derives essentially from a
difference in the intention of the legislature in enacting a
given statute.7 5 It is up to a court to determine whether the
legislature considered the provisions sufficiently important
that exact compliance is required or whether the legistature
merely intended the language of the statute as a guide for
conduct. It is thus the intent of the legislature which is con-
trolling; however, there is no set method for determining such
intent. As one court has stated:
Consideration must be given to the legislative history, the
language of the statute, its subject matter, the importance of
its provisions, their relation to the general object intended
to be0 accomplished by the act, and, finally, whether or not
there is a public or private right involved.76
The intent of the legislation may be implied by the lan-
guage used in the statute or inferred on grounds of policy and
reasonableness.77 "[S]tatutory requirements that are of the es-
sence of the thing required by statute are mandatory, while
those things which are not of the essence are directory. 7 8
72. 1A SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 25.03, at 298-300
(4th ed. C.D. Sands ed. 1972)[hereinafter cited as 1A SUTHERLAND].
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Wilcox v. Billings, 200 Kan. 654, , 438 P.2d 108, 111 (1968).
75. Karow v. Milwaukee County Civil Serv. Comm'n, 82 Wis. 2d 565, 572-73, 263
N.W.2d 214, 217-18 (1978); City of Wauwatosa v. Milwaukee County, 22 Wis. 2d. 184,
190-92, 125 N.W.2d 386, 389-90 (1963).
76. State ex rel. Laurisch v. Pohl, 214 Minn. 221, -, 8 N.W.2d 227, 229 (1943),
quoted in IA SUTHERLAND, supra note 72, § 25.03, at 299.
77. Karow v. Milwaukee County Civil Serv. Comm'n, 82 Wis. 2d 565, 570-71, 263
N.W.2d 214, 217 (1978); State ex rel. Werlein v. Elamore, 33 Wis. 2d 288, 293, 147
N.W.2d 252, 254-55 (1967).
78. 2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 57.03, at 416 (4th
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While there is no set guide for determining whether a statute
is mandatory or directory, and any such construction is a re-
sult of interpretation, it is said that the word "shall" usually
indicates a mandatory intent.79 And, additionally, where the
time of performance is important, or the manner of perform-
ance is essential to the purpose of the statute, it is usually
found that the statute was intended by the legislature to be
mandatory in nature.80
In Wisconsin Town House Builders v. City of Madison,8'
the condemnor followed the practice used prior to the 1959
amendment82 to chapter 32 and instead of itemizing the dam-
ages in the jurisdictional offer, merely listed a total amount.
The court responded by stating:
Any fair-minded owner would expect that [sic] amount of
money included damages for existing, future and potential
rights of access which the offer said the city was taking in
addition to the triangular piece of land. To avoid any such
misconception, sec. 32.05(3)(d), Stats., requires an itemiza-
tion of damages; this is not directional but mandatory. In
the note to the 1959 revision of ch. 32, we find, "Note [Sub-
sec.4], - The taking of private property for public use is a
procedure in which the property owner should be given
great consideration. He should be clearly informed °with re-
spect to the lettered items in sub. (3).''83
Because the condemnor did not follow the required pro-
cedure of the statute and, instead listed the total amount
rather than an itemized amount, the court found that the ju-
risdictional offer was "so defective that it [could not] stand
and must be declared void."8'
ed. C.D. Sands ed. 1973).
79. Karow v. Milwaukee County Civil Serv. Comm'n, 82 Wis. 2d 565, 570-71, 263
N.W.2d 214, 217 (1978); State v. Christopherson, 36 Wis. 2d 574, 583-84, 153 N.W.2d
631, 637 (1967).
80. Karow v. Milwaukee County Civil Serv. Comm'n, 82 Wis. 2d 565, 573, 263
N.W.2d 214, 218 (1978); Marathon County v. Eau Claire County, 3 Wis. 2d. 662, 666,
668, 89 N.W.2d 271, 273, 274 (1958); State v. Industrial Comm'n, 233 Wis. 461, 466,
289 N.W. 769, 771 (1940).
81. 37 Wis. 2d 44, 154 N.W.2d 232 (1967).
82. See 1959 Wis. Laws Ch. 639.
83. Wisconsin Town House Builders v. City of Madison, 37 Wis. 2d 44, 54, 154
N.W.2d 232, 236-37 (1967) (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 55, 154 N.W.2d at 237.
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The factors which seem to have influenced the court in its
findings were that the use of a total amount might tend to
create a "misconception" on the part of the landowner and
that the legislative intent as evidenced by the committee note
to the bill stated that the landowner "should be clearly in-
formed with respect to" the type of money damages the con-
demnor was making. On the surface, these two factors do not
seem to be particularly significant, nor do they seem the sort
of consideration which would lead a court to declare that their
omission makes a jurisdictional offer void. Nevertheless, the
court found that the requirement of the statute that the dam-
ages be itemized was a mandatory and not merely a directory
provision.
It appears that much the same argument could be made in
regard to the condemnor's duty to provide the landowner with
the required names and map under sections 32.05(2a) and
32.06(2a). The committee note to the 1977 revision of those
sections evinces the same sort of legislative concern that the
landowner have sufficient information during the condemna-
tion proceeding. When it is remembered that the court has
stated that the right of the landowner to be able to negotiate
prior to any condemnation proceeding is a valuable and im-
portant one, the provision relating to the condemnor's produc-
tion of the names of neighboring landowners and the required
map can be considered material to the total negotiation pro-
cess. This being the case, it is not unreasonable to consider
that the court would find this requirement mandatory and
one which, when omitted, renders the jurisdictional offer void
and thus deprives the condemning authority of its statutory
jurisdiction to condemn.
IV. CONCLUSION
The fifth amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the Wis-
consin Constitution and chapter 32 of the state statutes all
prescribe prerequisites and procedures for the exercise of the
state's inherent right to take private property. It cannot be
denied that such a power is a fundamental and necessary at-
tribute of a sovereign existence. But equally, it cannot be de-
nied that the indiscriminate and uncontrollable exercise of
such a power could well lead to the destruction of a state's
existence. Thus, limitations and restrictions have been placed
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on the exercise of the power of eminent domain. In most in-
stances, it has been required that these restrictions be com-
plied with exactly or the subsequent taking will be void and of
no effect. As has been stated, the twin requirements of an at-
tempt at prior negotiations and the provision of a map and a
list containing the names of similarly situated property own-
ers should be considered as a mandatory condition precedent
to the exercise of the power to take. Compliance with these
requirements, in addition to the constitutional restrictions of
due process, just compensation, and a public use, will ensure
that an owner, forced to relinquish his property for the com-
mon good, will have every possible opportunity to arrive at a
fair and equitable settlement with the sovereign to which his
own private interests must be subordinated.
Ross F. PLAETZER
